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State Dept. review completed

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E.O. 12065: TDS-2 5/22/02 (MCCALL, SHERROD) OR-P

TAGS: MNUC, PARM

SUBJECT: USA INSTITUTE ANALYST PROPOSES ARMS CONTROL

- TOPICS FOR REAGAN-BREZHNEV SUMMIT

REF: A) FBIS USSR 26 APR 82, B) MOSCOW 4888,

- C) MOSCOW 5169

1. (CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT).

2. SUMMARY: A USA INSTITUTE ANALYST HAS ASKED FOR OUR VIEWS ON TWO QUESTIONS WHICH HE SUGGESTS THAT REAGAN AND BREZHNEV MIGHT DISCUSS AT A SUMMIT:

1) OPPORTUNITIES FOR JOINT US-SOVIET ACTIONS ON NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION, AND 2) THE CREATION OF

A MECHANISM FOR COORDINATION ON NUCLEAR CONFLICTS INVOLVING THIRD POWERS, ALONG THE LINES OF THE

"JACKSON-NUNN" PROPOSAL. THE ANALYST CLAIMS THAT

THE MAIN FOCUS OF SOVIET CONCERN IS THE "NEW NUCLEAR POWERS NEAR THE USSR," ISRAEL AND PAKISTAN.

REGARDING THE FIRST QUESTION, THE ANALYST APPEARS

TO BE REITERATING SOVIET INTEREST IN FURTHER

CONSULTATIONS BETWEEN NUCLEAR EXPORTING STATES.

THE ANALYST'S SECOND QUESTION REVEALS AN INTEREST

IN USING THE PROPOSED NUNN AMENDMENT TO RESUSCITATE

A PROPOSAL ADVANCED BY THE USSR TEN YEARS AGO

BUT REJECTED BY THE U.S. IN THE NEGOTIATIONS THAT

LED TO THE 1973 US-SOVIET AGREEMENT ON THE PREVENTION

OF NUCLEAR WAR. THE ANALYST SUGGESTED THAT THE

USSR MIGHT BE WILLING TO SUPPORT THE U.S.

PROPOSAL FOR A MIDDLE EAST NUCLEAR WEAPONS FREE

ZONE, AND PERHAPS A SIMILAR PROPOSAL FOR SOUTH

ASIA. EMBASSY REQUESTS WASHINGTON'S GUIDANCE

ON WHAT RESPONSE, IF ANY, SHOULD BE MADE. END

SUMMARY.

3. ON MAY 17 THE USA INSTITUTE GAVE EMBOFF A LONG-REQUESTED APPOINTMENT WITH STRATEGIC ANALYST

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VALERIY F. DAVYDOV. THE MEETING WAS FOR THE NEXT DAY, WHEN BREZHNEV WAS ADDRESSING THE KOMSOMOL CONGRESS. DAVYDOV OPENED THE MEETING BY READING TWO QUESTIONS FROM A PREPARED TEXT:

-- DOES THE U. S. SEE ANY OPPORTUNITIES FOR JOINT US-SOVIET ACTIONS IN THE FIELD OF NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION? WHAT CONCRETE MEASURES COULD BE UNDERTAKEN?

-- WHAT IS THE U.S. VIEW OF THE PROPOSAL BY SENATORS "JACKSON AND NUNN" FOR THE CREATION OF A JOINT US-SOVIET MECHANISM FOR COORDINATION OF NUCLEAR CONFLICTS INVOLVING THIRD POWERS?

4. DAVYDOV SAID THAT "PERHAPS THESE PROBLEMS COULD BE A SUBJECT FOR DISCUSSION BETWEEN PRESIDENTS BREZHNEV AND REAGAN AT A SUMMIT."

5. DAVYDOV ASKED EMBOFF FOR HIS VIEWS. EMBOFF BEGGED OFF BY SAYING THAT HE WAS NOT AT THE MOMENT ABLE TO RESPOND AUTHORITATIVELY. HE WOULD HAVE TO CONSULT FIRST. DAVYDOV THEN LAUNCHED INTO AN APPARENT BACKGROUND EXPLANATION ON WHY HE WAS ASKING THE QUESTIONS. DAVYDOV'S MAIN POINTS WERE:

-- THE FALKLANDS CRISIS ILLUSTRATES THE NECESSITY OF KNOWING EXACTLY WHAT NUCLEAR POTENTIALS ARE OF THIRD COUNTRIES, IN ORDER TO PREVENT NUCLEAR CONFLICTS AND THE INVOLVEMENT OF GREAT POWERS.

-- WE MUST DISCUSS THE QUESTION OF NUCLEAR POTENTIALS IN ORDER TO BE ABLE TO TAKE CONCRETE ACTIONS.

-- AS FOR THE SOVIET UNION, THERE ARE ESSENTIAL NONPROLIFERATION QUESTIONS NEAR ITS BORDERS. THE MIDDLE EAST IS AN ESPECIALLY SERIOUS PROBLEM AND SO IS INDIA-PAKISTAN.

-- WE KNOW THAT PRESIDENT REAGAN IS NOT GOING TO RECONVENE THE LONDON SUPPLIERS GROUP, ALTHOUGH THERE IS CONGRESSIONAL SUPPORT FOR THIS STEP. FOR EXAMPLE, SENATOR HART AND CONGRESSMAN OTTINGER, WHO HAVE PROPOSED A RESOLUTION TO LIMIT THE TRANSFER OF NUCLEAR TECHNOLOGY, FAVOR THIS APPROACH. THUS WE CANNOT EXCLUDE THAT PRESIDENT REAGAN MAY DO SOMETHING.

-- IS PRESIDENT REAGAN, IN HIS APPROACH TO STRATEGIC ARMS TALKS, DIRECTED BY THE CONCEPT OF THE CARTER ADMINISTRATION THAT NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT AND NONPROLIFERATION ARE LINKED IN ACCORDANCE WITH ARTICLE 6 OF THE NONPROLIFERATION TREATY(NPT)?

-- THE PROBLEMS OF DISARMAMENT ARE NOT JUST THOSE OF THE U.S. AND THE USSR, BUT OF OTHER STATES, ESPECIALLY THE ISSUE OF NONPROLIFERATION. SCONER

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OR LATER THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION MAY TAKE THE POSITION OF THE CARTER ADMINISTRATION ON NON-PROLIFERATION.

-- IT IS A PITY THE 1980 NPT REVIEW CONFERENCE DID NOT END SUCCESSFULLY.

-- THE AGREEMENT ON THE PREVENTION OF NUCLEAR WAR DOES NOT CONTAIN ENOUGH FROM A PRACTICAL POINT OF VIEW.

-- WE MUST HAVE DISCUSSIONS TO DEAL WITH THIRD COUNTRIES. (EMBOFF ASKED IF DAVYDOV WAS THINKING OF CHINA; DAVYDOV SAID THE FOCUS SHOULD BE ON NEW NUCLEAR POWERS.)

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-- MAYBE THE SOVIET UNION WOULD BE READY TO SUPPORT THE U.S. PROPOSAL FOR A MIDDLE EAST NUCLEAR FREE ZONE. MAYBE THE SOVIET UNION WOULD TAKE THE SAME POSITION TOWARD SOUTH ASIA. WE ARE CONCERNED THAT THE U.S. IS PAYING TOO LITTLE ATTENTION THERE.

-- MAYBE IT IS NECESSARY TO MAKE THESE ISSUES A PRIORITY PROBLEM FOR OUR TWO COUNTRIES. THE OTTINGER PROPOSAL CONCERNS ONLY TECHNOLOGY, BUT THE "JACKSON-NUNN PROPOSAL" IS BETTER BECAUSE IT CONCERNS JOINT ACTIONS ON NUCLEAR CONFLICTS INVOLVING THIRD COUNTRIES.

7. COMMENT: DAVYDOV'S PRESENTATION SEEMS TO BE AN EFFORT TO FLOAT TRIAL BALLOONS. THIS MAY BE AT THE INSTITUTE'S INITIATIVE, OR IT MAY HAVE A HIGHER-LEVEL IMPRIMATUR. WE CANNOT BE SURE.

8. IN RAISING HIS FIRST QUESTION DAVYDOV SEEMS TO BE ASKING WHAT IDEAS THE U.S. MAY HAVE IN MIND REGARDING FUTURE MECHANISMS FOR NUCLEAR SUPPLIER CONSULTATIONS.

9. IN PUTTING HIS SECOND QUESTION DAVYDOV APPEARS TO BE ASKING WHETHER THE U.S. MIGHT BE INTERESTED IN EXPANDING THE SCOPE OF THE 1973 AGREEMENT TO PREVENT NUCLEAR WAR, PERHAPS ALONG THE LINES OF THE PROPOSED NUNN AMENDMENT WHICH WOULD ESTABLISH A CRISIS CENTER FOR MONITORING AND CONTAINING NUCLEAR WEAPONS USED BY THIRD PARTIES.

10. DAVYDOV'S EMPHASIS ON "COORDINATION" WITH RESPECT TO NUCLEAR CONFLICTS INVOLVING THIRD POWERS IS REMINISCENT OF DOBRYNIN'S MAY 1972 PROPOSAL TO KISSINGER THAT THE U.S. AND THE USSR "SHALL PREVENT" SITUATIONS WHEREBY ACTIONS OF THIRD COUNTRIES MIGHT PRODUCE A NUCLEAR WAR. DOBRYNIN'S PROPOSAL WAS REJECTED, IN PART BECAUSE OF ITS CONDOMINIUM AND ANTI-CHINESE IMPLICATIONS, ALTHOUGH SUBSEQUENT US-SOVIET NEGOTIATIONS LED TO THE 1973 AGREEMENT.

11. DAVYDOV PUBLISHED A LONG, POLEMICAL ARTICLE IN KRASNAYA ZVEZDA APRIL 20 CRITICAL OF THE NUCLEAR PROGRAMS AND INTENTIONS OF PAKISTAN, ISRAEL, AND SOUTH AFRICA, AND OF ALLEGED U.S. CONNECTIONS WITH THESE STATES (REF A). ALTHOUGH IN THE ARTICLE DAVYDOV PUT EMPHASIS ON SOUTH AFRICA AS WELL AS PAKISTAN AND ISRAEL, DAVYDOV'S PRIVATE REMARKS MAKE IT CLEAR THAT MOSCOW'S REAL WORRY IS CLOSER TO HOME, THE MIDDLE EAST AND SOUTH ASIA.

ACTION REQUESTED:

12. DAVYDOV APPEARS TO EXPECT A RESPONSE TO HIS QUESTIONS. WE WOULD APPRECIATE WASHINGTON'S GUIDANCE ON WHAT, IF ANY, RESPONSE SHOULD BE MADE.

HARTMAN

END OF MESSAGE

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